After months of emulating the videos and tactics of the Islamic State, on Mar. 7th, Boko Haram pledged bayat to
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIL) through the release of an
audiotape. The pledge was accompanied by a renewed offensive against the
city of Maiduguri, with four suicide bombing attacks.
Today, ISIL seems to have accepted Boko Haram’s pledge.
The extent of the partnership between Boko Haram and ISIL remains
unclear, but the declaration marks an important moment in the evolution
of the Boko Haram insurgency.
What
began as a dissident sect confined to a small area in Borno State is
now a 4,000-6,000 strong force that controls significant territory in
the country, has launched regional attacks, and is now cultivating
international terrorist links. Recent videos and statements from Boko
Haram have emulated the style of ISIL’s propaganda; stylistically, Boko
Haram has increased its professionalism and sophistication and even
adopted the same music as ISIL in the “opening credits” of their films.
Boko Haram has even adopted the same music as ISIL in the “opening credits” of their films. Such
mimicry may generate international credentials, though the extent to
which smoothly edited videos will generate support in Nigeria remains to
be seen.
Roughly one-third of the Nigerian population has access to the
Internet, though the rate of Internet penetration in the country is
growing rapidly. Internet usage rates are almost certainly lower in the
country’s northeast, where Boko Haram is the strongest, but knowledge of
its link to ISIL through other outlets would still confer legitimacy on
Boko Haram.
In recent months, Boko Haram and ISIL have both relied upon strategies of taking territory,
rather than engaging in the sort of sensationalized attacks against
Western targets that characterize Al Qaeda and its affiliates. While Al
Qaeda has relied upon donor funding, ISIL relies upon selling oil on the
black market and other illicit activities to finance its operations;
over recent months, Boko Haram’s financing seems increasingly linked to
criminal networks in the Sahel, including the possible sale of abducted
girls.
The group has also been involved in bank robberies since its inception.
The value in an affiliation with ISIL, for Boko Haram, therefore lies
less in the potential operational assistance and more in the
facilitation of recruitment from such an arrangement.
In making bayat,
Boko Haram accepts the authority and legitimacy of the Caliphate
established by ISIL. An affiliation under these terms is likely to
bolster the legitimacy and appeal of Boko Haram in Nigeria and
throughout the Sahel. Much ink has been spilled attempting to explain
the appeal of ISIL and its ability to draw in foreign recruits.
According to the Boston Globe, a tentative consensus has emerged that the group has been able to create a “clear – and to some, compelling – idea of citizenship and state-building in a region almost completely bereft of either.”
In making bayat, Boko Haram accepts the authority and legitimacy of the Caliphate established by ISIL. The
same process is at play in Nigeria. Though the country returned to
democratic rule in 1999, citizen trust in government is low. Attitudinal
data collected by the AfroBarometer
found that, 45% of Nigerians characterized their government as being
“very bad” at managing the economy. Nearly a quarter of respondents
(24%) said that they trusted the President, Goodluck Jonathon “not at
all” – a figure made all the more remarkable when you consider this
measurement does not capture public opinion during Boko Haram’s
escalation in 2014.
In particular, the country’s predominantly northern
regions are relatively economically underdeveloped, allowing Boko Haram
to mobilize support in its earlier years behind a narrative of
inequitable governance.
The statistics
comparing the country’s north and south demonstrate the contrast
between the development of the two regions – literacy in Lagos is
estimated to be 92%, whereas it is only 49% in Kano, the northern
commercial capital, and a below 15% in Borno, the ‘epicenter’ of the
Boko Haram crisis. Just as ISIL uses rhetoric and historical notions
that appeal broadly to Muslim populations, in particular the historical
strength of Caliphates, Boko Haram has been able to galvanize support
against the Nigerian state on the basis of it being both inept and
un-Islamic.
Boko Haram has been able to galvanize support against the Nigerian state on the basis of it being both inept and un-Islamic. On Sunday, Mar. 8, Niger and Chad launched an offensive against Boko Haram in the country’s north and four days later, the UN
announced support for the African Union regional force. Now,
international observers are speculating whether the ISIL-Boko Haram
affiliation will spur American involvement in the conflict. Ultimately,
though, these responses ignore the roots of the insurgency, as outsiders
have done since Boko Haram’s inception; understanding why Salafist
jihadism is an appealing ideology is critical to launching an effective
response to the combatants.
A
deeper consideration of Boko Haram’s ideological appeal and growth
underlines how inefficient the Nigerian state has been in responding to
terror with extrajudicial violence and human rights abuses
against civilians in the north. Such attrition has only served to
enforce the insurgents’ claims that the state is illegitimate. And while
an affiliation between ISIL and Boko Haram may not radically alter the
characteristics of the Nigerian insurgency, it will amplify this
dangerous message.
Follow Hilary on Twitter at @HilaryMatfess.
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